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THE DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE CONVERSION:
I, CONVERSION BY CONTRACT*
MILTON M. HERMANNOF ALL the principles of equity, few have had consequences as
far-reaching as the doctrine of equitable conversion. Too
often this doctrine is thought of in a single context: The
consequences, in equity, flowing from a contract for the sale of land,
prior to the consummation of the sale by delivery of a deed. But the
impact of this doctrine in other areas of our law-both on property
and contract rights-has been enormous. Indeed, its role in the fields
of Wills and Trusts-in determining the devolution of property to
heirs at law, next of kin, devisees, legatees, and beneficiaries of trusts,
both testamentary and inter vivos-sometimes overshadows its role in
the area of contracts for the sale of land.
* II, CONVERSION BY WILL AND TRUST AGREEMENT, by the same author, will appear
in a subsequent issue.
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A simple illustration, with varying factual situations, will serve to
present the principal problems posed by the doctrine. For conven-
ience, the parties to all cases discussed, both hypothetical and actual,
will be designated throughout this article by these symbols: V for
vendor, P for purchaser, W for widow or widower, and D for dece-
dent. Unless otherwise indicated, it will be assumed that all parties
are residents of Illinois, that all properties are situated here, and that
all instruments are executed here.
V and P enter into a written contract under which V agrees to
sell and P agrees to buy a residence for the sum of $25,000.00, pay-
able $2,500.00 down and the balance upon delivery of a deed. The
property is worth $50,000.00, but for reasons of his own V is selling
it to P at a bargain price. V is to convey a merchantable title, by
warranty deed, within 60 days. He is the insured under a fire insur-
ance policy in the amount of $50,000.00, which he is to assign to P
when he delivers the deed. The contract contains no provision as to
who is to bear the burden of loss if the premises are destroyed by fire
or other casualty. We may now assume the following varying sets of
facts:
1. The residence is destroyed by fire before delivery of the deed
and, of course, before payment of the balance of the purchase price. Is
P liable for the balance of the price? May V recover $50,000.00 from
the insurance company (that sum being both the face amount of the
policy and the actual value of the property), or will his maximum
recovery be $22,500.00, the balance of the purchase price? If he
recovers from the company, will he hold the proceeds of the policy
(whatever they may be) as a trustee for P's benefit? And should the
consequences flowing from this transaction depend upon whether P
has done everything entitling him to a deed (in this case the payment
of the entire purchase price) or should they flow simply from the
execution of the contract itself?
2. V dies shortly after the contract is made. At his death the deed
has not been delivered and, of course, the balance of the purchase
price has not been paid. V leaves no will, and is survived by W, and
his brother, X, as his only heirs at law. He leaves no descendants. Are
W and X or V's personal representative entitled to the benefit of the
contract? If the balance of the purchase price goes to W and X as V's
heirs, they will receive it in equal shares. If it goes to the personal
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representative, the entire amount (after payment of expenses of
administration and claims) will belong to W.1
3. P dies shortly after the contract is made. At his death the deed
has not been delivered and, of course, the balance of the purchase
price has not been paid. P leaves no will, and is survived by W, and his
brother, X, as his only heirs at law. He leaves no descendants. After
payment of expenses of administration and claims against the estate,
there is a balance of $22,500.00 in cash in the administrator's hands.
May X compel payment by the administrator of the balance of the
purchase price with the cash in the administrator's hands, and then
claim an undivided one-half interest in the residence?
4. Prior to the making of the contract, V had executed a will by
which he devised the residence to W. Is the devise adeemed by the
contract? 2
5. Subsequent to the making of the contract, V executes a will
devising all his right, title and interest in the premises to Z, and be-
queathing his residuary estate to W. If P completes the transaction
after V's death, by paying the balance of the purchase price, will Z
be entitled to the proceeds of the sale, by virtue of the devise, or will
the proceeds pass to W under the residuary clause of V's will?
6. Subsequent to the making of the contract, P executes a will
whereby he devises all his real property to X and bequeaths all his
personal property to Y. W predeceases P. Who is entitled to the
residence under the will, X or Y?
7. At his death V owns another parcel of real estate, Whiteacre.
His will directs his executor to sell Whiteacre and to pay the pro-
ceeds of the sale to V's son, Z. After V's death, but before Whiteacre
has been sold, Z dies intestate, survived by his wife, W, and a brother.
Is W entitled to all the proceeds of the sale, or is Z's brother entitled
to half of them?
8. V bequeaths $35,000 to T, as Trustee, with directions to pur-
l Under Section 11 of the Probate Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § It (1961), "When
there is no descendant but a surviving spouse and also a parent, brother, sister, or de-
scendant of a brother or sister of the decedent," the entire personal estate goes to the
surviving spouse, but one-half of the real estate goes to such spouse and the other one-
half to the parents, brothers and sisters of the decedent in equal parts, allowing to the
surviving parent, if one is dead, a double portion.
2 "A testamentary gift of testator's specific real or personal property is adeemed, or
fails completely, when the thing given does not exist as part of his estate at the time
of his death." ATKINSON, WILLS 134 (2d ed. 1953),
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chase a residence for V's daughter, M, a widow. After V's death but
before T has purchased the residence, M dies, leaving a will whereby
she devises "all my real estate, wherever located, to my daughter X"
and bequeaths "all my personal property of every kind to my son,
Y." Who is entitled to the money in the hands of the trustee, X or
y?3
THE ORIGIN AND MEANING OF THE DOCTRINE OF
EQUITABLE CONVERSION
The origin of the doctrine is uncertain and disputed.4 Cases ex-
pounding it can be found as early as 1678.' The applicable principles
"were developed in a single court-the English court of chancery-
beginning early in the seventeenth century and reaching logical sym-
metry some two hundred years later in the decisions of Lord Eldon
and the writings of Sugden."
The premises on which the Court of Chancery proceeded became
the basis for conclusions which, though strictly logical, were some-
times startling in their consequences. It has been said that this "corner
of property law ... has, like that which includes the classic learning
as to contingent remainders and the Rule against Perpetuities, an
almost mathematical atmosphere." 7 But it is not possible to solve all
problems involving equitable conversion by deductive reasoning.
Here, as elsewhere, "[T]he life of the law has not been logic; it has
been experience.""
Equitable conversion was defined in the early English case of
Fletcher v. Ashburner as "that change in the nature of property by
which, for certain purposes, real estate is considered as personal, and
personal estate as real, and transmissible and descendible as such."
8 Additional problems (particularly in the field of decedents' estates) will be explored
in this article, but it is hoped that the problems posed above will serve to stimulate
the reader's interest and whet his legal appetite.
4 Davis, The Origin of the Doctrine of Equitable Conversion by Contract, 25 Ky. L.J.
58 (1936).
5 Bubb's Case, 2 Freeman 38, 22 Eng. Rep. 32 (1678).
6 Simpson, Legislative Changes in the Law of Equitable Conversion by Contract: 1,
44 YALE L.J. 559, 560 (1935).
7 Ibid.
8 HOLMES, Tim COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
9 1 Brown Ch. 497, 1 Lead. Cas. Eq. 4th Am. Ed. 1118 (1784).
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Our Supreme Court adopted this definition verbatim in Young v.
Sinsabaugb,10 adding:
It is an application of the maxim that equity regards that as done which ought
to be done. An express declaration in the instrument that the land shall be
treated as money, although not sold, or that the money shall be treated as land,
although not actually laid out in the purchase of it, is not essential. The direc-
tion to convert may arise by necessary implication from the nature of the
instrument or the language employed.
'Pomeroy" states the elements of the doctrine clearly and suc-
cinctly:
One of the most direct and evident results of the principle [that "Equity re-
gards as done that which ought to be done"] is the equitable property which
arises from the doctrine of conversion,-when real estate is treated by equity
as personal property, or personal estate as real property; land as money, or
money as land,... A conversion may thus take place where, by a will, a deed,
or family settlement, land is actually devised or conveyed, or money or securi-
ties are actually assigned to trustees, with directions in the one case to sell the
land, and pay over the proceeds to the beneficiary, and in the other to invest
the fund in the purchase of the land to be then conveyed to him; or it may in
like manner take place where, by marriage articles or other executory agree-
ment, land is covenanted to be conveyed, or money is covenanted to be as-
signed, in like manner and for like purposes. The effect of the conversion is a
direct consequence of the principle in question. Personal estate becomes, to all
intents and purposes, in the view of equity, real, and real estate personal. Money
directed to be invested in land descends to the heir of the original beneficiary,
or passes under a general description of real property in his will, while land
directed to be converted into money goes to his personal representatives, or is
included in a residuary bequest of his "personal property."
These rules have been applied by some courts with the precision
of a mathematical equation. But just as a glance at the formula
"E - MC 2 does not give the "why" of relativity, so a glance at
the consequences flowing from the equitable conversion of property
does not tell us "why," as a matter of policy, such consequences are
desirable. We shall examine here a substantial number of the cases
in an attempt to discover the "why" underlying the rules; and we
shall consider whether the rules as applied have had sensible results
or whether they have been applied blindly and without meaning.
It should be observed at the outset that since equitable conversion
is a creature of the Court of Chancery, the doctrine "has no appli-
cation at law."1 2 Thus, at law a contract for the sale of land has no
10 342 Ill. 82, 85, 173 N.E. 784, 786 (1930).
112 POMEROY, EQuIrY JURISPRUDENCE, S 371 (5th ed. 1941).
12 Bouslough v. Bouslough, 306 Ill. 24, 137 N.E. 517, 518 (1922).
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effect on the title. If there be a breach, the party not at fault may
sue for damages. So long as the contract remains executory, the buyer
has no property rights; he has only a contract right against the seller.
Legal title passes when, and only when, a deed is delivered to and
accepted by the buyer.
Nor does this doctrine have any application in a strictly statutory
proceeding. In Connell v. Crosby,"3 the State urged that the doctrine
should be applied in determining inheritance tax liabilities. There the
testator devised a life estate to his wife, and the remainder in trust,
with directions to the trustee to convert the trust property, both real
and personal, into money, and to devote a portion thereof to founding
a college. Certain real estate so devised to the trustee was located
outside the State of Illinois. If treated as realty, it was not taxable;
if treated as personalty, it was. The State contended that since the
trustee was directed to convert all the trust property into money,
including the real estate located outside the State, it should all be
treated as personal property. The court rejected this contention, say-
ing: 14
The will directs the conversion of the real estate into money for the purpose
of creating a fund to be devoted to the establishment of the college, and it is
argued that under the doctrine of equity the land is to be regarded as converted
into personalty, and . . . that the bequest of the proceeds of the sale of the
real estate is subject to the tax, as being personalty. The doctrine of equitable
conversion is an outgrowth of the maxim of equity that in a court of equity
that which ought to have been done is to be regarded as done. The doctrine of
equitable conversion is recognized in equity only, and is not given effect in
courts of law. . . . It cannot be applied in proceedings for the collection of
inheritance or succession taxes.
That a court of law may look upon a transaction with one eye and
view it from one aspect, and a court of equity may look upon the
same transaction with another eye and view it from a different aspect
is, of course, familiar to all students of Anglo-American jurispru-
dence. This dichotomy between law and equity-unique in our juris-
prudence and unknown to the Continent-is a fact of life to all
English and American lawyers.
Equity, treating as done that which ought to be done, takes the
view that what would normally be considered realty is personalty
and personalty realty. By the application of a fiction, the Chancellor
13 210 M1. 380, 390, 71 N.E. 350, 354 (1904).
14 Id. at 390, 71 N.E. at 354 (Emphasis added).
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holds that a magic conversion has occurred; and that which to the
eye of "outward seeming" ' appears to be terra firma is not terra firma
at all; it is personalty.
We shall deal (in this and in a subsequent article) with the impact
of the doctrine primarily in these areas: (1) conversion by contract
for the sale of land; and (2) conversion by will or inter vivos trust
instrument. Where the courts of this state have spoken in these areas
we shall direct our attention principally to the Illinois decisions; where
they have not, we shall consider cases from other jurisdictions.
We turn our attention here to equitable conversion by contract for
the sale of land, and its effect (a) on the rights and obligations of the
parties with respect to risk of loss and insurance coverage, and (b)
on the devolution of the property upon the death of either the vendor
or the purchaser, testate or intestate, before delivery of a deed. We
shall turn our attention, in the later article, to equitable conversion by
will or inter vivos trust agreement, and its effect on the devolution of
property to (a) heirs at law and next of kin, (b) legatees and devisees,
and (c) beneficiaries of trusts.
CONSEQUENCES OF CONVERSION BY CONTRACT
Justice Story, in discussing the application of the doctrine to con-
tracts for the sale of land, said:
The true meaning of this maxim is that equity will treat the subject matter, as
to collateral consequences and incidents, in the same manner as if the final acts
contemplated by the parties had been executed exacdy as they ought to have
been, not as they might have been executed.... The most common cases of the
application of the rule are under agreements.16
Lord Eldon first stated the doctrine in its modem form in Seaton
v. Slade:17
The effect of a contract for purchase is very different at Law and in Equity.
At Law the estate remains the estate of the vendor; and the money that of the
vendee. It is not so here. The estate from the sealing of the contract is the real
property of the vendee. It descends to his heirs. It is devisible by his will; and
the question, whose it is, is not to be discussed merely between the vendor and
vendee; but may be discussed between the representatives of the vendee.' 8
He might well have added that it "may be discussed between the
heirs and representatives of the vendor."
15 CaRoozo, J. in Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
16 1 STORY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE S 64g (11th ed. 1918).
17 7 Ves. Jun. 265, 273 (1802). Is Ibid. (Emphasis added).
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Jessel, M. R. in Lysaght v. Edwards,19 in commenting on the con-
sequences flowing from a specifically enforceable contract, said:
Being a valid contract, it has this remarkable effect, that it converts the estate,
so to say, in equity; it makes the purchase-money a part of the personal estate
of the vendor, and it makes the land a part of the real estate of the vendee;
and therefore all those cases on the doctrine of constructive conversion are
founded simply on this, that a valid contract actually changes the ownership
of the estate in equity.
A contemporary author 20 in the field of equity sums up the con-
sequences of a contract for the sale of land on the devolution of
property rights thus:
Since the purchaser now equitably owns realty, upon his death his rights in the
property are realty and descend to those entitled to his realty, subject to the
rights of the vendor under the contract. The vendor, on the other hand, now
owns personalty, a chose in action for the payment of the rest of the purchase
price, and on his death, those who take his personalty would succeed to the
right to the payment of the rest of the purchase price. So far as concerns the
legal title which he still holds as security and as a trustee, it passes to those who
would succeed to his realty but they take it in turn as trustees, with the duty to
transfer it to the contract purchaser at the time for performance of the con-
tract.
Dean (later Chief Justice) Harlan F. Stone, in critically exam-
ining the fictional basis for the doctrine, said: 21
The effect of the contract of sale of land has been stated to be that the vendor
becomes a trustee of the land for the vendee and the vendee becomes a trustee
of the purchase money for the vendor. While this statement contains a germ
of truth, it is obviously inaccurate, because the vendor is unlike a trustee in
many particulars. He has a personal interest in the land; he is entitled to its
rents, issues and profits until the date of performance; he holds the title as
security for the payment of the purchase price; the proceeds of the insur-
ance effected by him he holds for his own benefit and not the benefit of the
vendee. The vendee, on the other hand, is a mere debtor. He holds no specific
property for the vendor, and his sole obligation in law and in equity is to pay
the purchase money on the conveyance of the vendor's title.
In suggesting a rationale of his own-quite independent of the
fiction of conversion-Stone continued:
More accurately stated, the obligation of the vendor in equity is to convey
land to the vendee. The vendee is the owner of the correlative right in equity
to have the vendor convey .... Since the vendee has an equitable right to call
for a conveyance of the land, just as in the case of the law affecting the right
of a cestui que trust of land, his right for purposes of devolution will be treated
19 L.R. 2 Ch. 499, 507 (1875).
20 DEFUNIAK, HANDBOOK OF MODERN EQUITY 208 (2d ed. 1956).
21 Stone, Equitable Conversion by Contract, 13 COLUM. L. REv. 369, 372-73.
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as land. The vendee's equitable right, therefore, in equity passes to his heir or
devisee and in jurisdictions where there is dower in an equitable right to land
his widow is entitled to dower .... [Tihe equitable right of the vendee to call
for the land in the hands of the vendor should pass to the vendee's heirs, regard-
less of any theory of equitable conversion.
The result, therefore, is that . . . where both the vendor and the vendee are
dead, the vendee's equitable right to the performance has descended to the
heir, who has the right to specific performance. The obligation to convey, how-
ever, rests upon the vendor's heir, not because he is subject to obligations in
contract, but because he is in the precise position of a donee of property held
subject to an equitable obligation. He will not be permitted to retain the
property in violation of that obligation any more than would a donee of trust
property be permitted to retain it.
The right to receive the purchase money, however, has at law vested in the
personal representative of the vendor, since the legal ownership of the contract,
which is personal property, passes to the personal representative and not the
heir; and since the proceeds of the vendor's contract, by specific performance,
is money, which is personal property, there is no equitable principle by which
the personal representative of the vendor can or should be deprived of the
right to receive the purchase money.
And he concluded as follows:
The final result, therefore, of the specific performance of the contract for the
sale of land after the death of the vendor and vendee will be that the vendee's
heir will be entitled to the conveyance because he is the heir of the one
equitably entitled to real estate. The vendor's heir must convey because he
holds property subject to his ancestor's equitable obligation to convey, and
he cannot be in a better position than a donee of such property. A conveyance
cannot be had without payment of the purchase price to the vendor's personal
representative, who is legally entitled thereto, and who is equitably entitled to
the security of the legal title. The vendee's personal representative must pay
the purchase price, not only because he is the only person obligated to pay, but
because payment must be made in order to finally dispose of the equitable
rights of the vendee's heir and the obligation of the vendor's legal representa-
tive. All four parties are therefore necessary parties to the action for specific
performance, the vendor's heir to give title; the vendee's heir to receive the
conveyance; the vendee's personal representative to pay the purchase price; and
the vendor's personal representative to receive it.
It is thus apparent that a result is reached commonly explained by the doctrine
of equitable conversion, which nevertheless may be reached quite independ-
ently of it, and which really bears no relation to the assertion that the "sealing
of the contract" renders the land the property of the vendee and the purchase
money the property of the vendor.
RISK OF LOSS
The principle of equitable conversion is perhaps most familiar to
lawyers in this area: If, during the interval between contract and
conveyance, the property is damaged or destroyed by fire, flood or
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earthquake, who bears the burden of loss? If the property is taken
by eminent domain, who receives the award? Who, in short, is the
owner during the gap between contract and deed?
At law, the risk of loss traditionally has been placed on the vendor.
On this point, Dean Langdell said: 22
If a contract be made for the purchase and sale of land which has buildings on
it, and, after the making of the contract, but before the conveyance of the land,
the buildings be casually destroyed by fire, upon whom will the loss fall? At
law it will clearly fall upon the vendor in all cases.
In equity, however, the majority of courts have placed the risk on
the purchaser; 23 but for these courts the most troublesome problem
has been to determine as of what moment the risk passes from vendor
to purchaser.
At least five different views have been advanced as to who should
bear the burden of loss; and at least three of them have substantial
support in the decisions: 24
(1) The view most widely accepted is that the risk of loss is on
the purchaser the moment the contract is signed. The source of this
doctrine is said to be Paine v. Meller;25 but careful analysis will show
that the case does not go that far. There the parties signed the con-
tract on September Ist; the purchaser immediately made a deposit
on account of the purchase price; and the vendor was to deliver the
deed and the purchaser was to pay the balance of the purchase price
on September 29th. On that date defects in title were discovered.
The parties negotiated with respect to the defects, and they finally
agreed upon a conveyance with a reduction in price. The vendor
prepared the deeds, and on December 17th the parties were ready to
consummate the transaction. On December 18th, before the deeds
were delivered, the houses were burned. The vendor filed a bill in
equity for specific performance. The Court held that (a) if the pur-
chaser in fact accepted the title before the fire, the vendor was en-
titled to specific performance and (b) upon the conveyance being
made, the purchaser's right to rents and profits would relate back to
22 LA.G$DELL, A BRIEF SURVEY OF EQUITY JURISDICTION 58 (2d ed. 1908).
23 The cases are collected in Annot., 27 A.L.R. 2d 444 (1953).
24 No attempt is made here to classify the decisions in the various states in detail. The
cases are collected in annotations in 22 A.L.R. 575 (1923); 41 A.L.R. 1272 (1926);
46 A.L.R. 1126 (1927); 27 A.L.R. 2d 444 (1953). The Illinois decisions, of course, will
be dealt with in this article at length.
25 6 Ves. Jun. 350, 31 Eng. Rep. 1088 (1801).
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September 29th (the date on which the contract, by its terms, was
to have been consummated). The Chancellor referred to a Master
in Chancery the issue whether the purchaser had fully accepted the
title. The Court said:
As to the mere effect of the accident itself no solid objection can be founded
upon that simply; for if the party by the contract has become in equity the
owner of the premises, they are his to all intents and purposes. They are vend-
ible as his, chargeable as his, capable of being encumbered as his; they may be
devised as his; they may be assets; and they would descend to his heir.
From this case, most Courts have deduced the doctrine that the
purchaser is the beneficial owner from the time the contract is made;
but this conclusion is not warranted, either by what the Court held
on the facts or by what it said. What Paine v. Meller actually stands
for is this: Inasmuch as the parties were ready to consummate the
transaction immediately before the casualty, the purchaser was re-
garded in equity as the owner and charged with the 1oss.26 The risk
of loss shifted to the buyer when the time fixed for performance, or
later agreed upon, arrived, both parties being then ready to consum-
mate the sale. Stated otherwise, Paine holds: If, at the time of the loss,
the time had arrived for the parties to perform all acts required of
them, and they were then ready to do so, but through some accident,
mistake or delay, they did not perform, the purchaser will bear the
burden of loss as though he had received the deed. At law, no effect
can be given to the abortive attempt of the parties, or to such rights
as would have accrued if the necessary acts had taken place; but in
equity justice may be done by treating the case as though the transac-
tion had been executed. 27
This first view, held by a majority of the states-that the purchaser,
upon the signing of the contract, has "become in equity the owner
of the premises" so that "they are his to all intents and purposes ' 28 -
seems, on a superficial analysis, to apply the principle of equitable
conversion with strict logic; but a more penetrating analysis, it is
believed, will cause grave doubt as to the soundness of this view. In-
26 For cases which have challenged the validity of the broad deduction made by most
courts from Paine v. Meller see Wicks v. Bowman, 5 Daly 225 (N.Y., 1874) and Good
v. Jarrard, 93 S.C. 229, 76 S.E. 698 (1912). See also 1 STORY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE S 82,
et seq. (14th ed. 1918) and MERWIN, EQUITY S 124 (1895).
27 Story gives many examples of the application of the maxim under these circum-
stances, among which is Paine v. Meller itself. See 1 STORY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE S 82,
et seq. (14th ed. 1918).
28 Lord Eldon, in Paine v. Meller, 6 Ves. Jun. 350, 352, 31 Eng. Rep. 1088 (1801).
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asmuch as the principle of equitable conversion rests on the maxim
that "equity regards as done that which ought to be done," the doc-
trine should be applied only when the vendor's obligation to convey
has become fixed; and where the purchaser has not performed, either
because the time for his performance has not arrived or for some
other reason, no obligation devolves upon the vendor to convey.
(2) A strong minority of American states, following an early
Massachusetts decision2 9 hold that the risk of loss is on the vendor
until legal title is conveyed.30 These states, therefore, regardless of
how or whether they apply the principle of equitable conversion in
other areas of the law, give no effect to the doctrine in determining
risk of loss.
This view was stated with clarity in Hawkes v. Kehoe:3'
We need spend no time upon the numerous cases in England and in this coun-
try ... as to the rights of parties to such agreements upon a total or partial
destruction of the buildings by fire .... We are of opinion that in this com-
monwealth, when, as in this case, the conveyance is to be made of the whole
estate, including both land and buildings, for an entire price, and the value
of the buildings constitutes a large part of the total value of the estate, and the
terms of the agreement show that they constituted an important part of the
subject matter of the contract, it is now settled by the decision in Wells v.
Calnan, 107 Mass. 514, that the contract is to be construed as subject to the
implied condition that it no longer shall be binding if, before the time for the
conveyance to be made, the buildings are destroyed by fire. The loss by the
fire falls upon the vendor, the owner; and if he has not protected himself by
insurance, he can have no reimbursement of this loss; but the contract is no
longer binding upon either party. If the purchaser has advanced any part of
the price, he can recover it back .... 32
There are decisions or obiter dicta in at least two of the states adopt-
ing this view which place the risk of loss on the vendor even though
the purchaser is in possession.3 3
29 Thompson v. Gould, 37 Mass. 134 (1838). This case involved an action at law by
the purchaser under an oral contract to recover a deposit, so that the actual decision
is consistent with the majority rule. But there was a dictum to the effect that the same
result would have been reached in equity if the contract had been in writing, and the
later Massachusetts cases have adopted this view. See cases cited infra, foomote 32.
30 See Note, 12 COLtJM. L. REV. 257 (1912); Griffin, Risk of Loss in Executory Land
Contracts, 4 NoTRE DAME LAW 506 (1929).
3' 193 Mass. 419, 424, 79 N.E. 766, 767 (1907).
32See Libman v. Levenson, 236 Mass. 221, 128 N.E. 13 (1920) (holding that purchaser
could rescind by bill in equity and recover his deposit); Bissonnette v. Keyes, 319 Mass.
134, 64 N.E. 2d 926 (1946) (to the same effect).
3 Cooper v. Huntington, 178 Cal. 160, 172 Pac. 591 (1918) (installment contract);
Wong Ah Sure v. Ty Foot, 37 Cal. App. 465, 174 Pac. 64 (1918); La Chance v. Brown,
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(3) The third view, urged by Dean Langdell,3 4 but for which there
appears to be no support in the decisions, is that the risk of loss should
be on the vendor until the time agreed upon for the conveyance of
the legal title, and thereafter on the purchaser unless the vendor is
then in such default as to be unable specifically to enforce the contract.
(4) The fourth view, advanced by Professor Williston's persuasive
pen at an early date, 5 is that the risk of loss should be on the party
in possession, whether vendor or purchaser. It has been said "that the
purchaser is substantial owner of the property and should bear the
burdens of ownership, while the purchaser out of possession is not
substantial owner; this argument is supported by the decisions which
make the right to rents and profits and the liability for taxes and other
outgoings depend upon possession. Moreover ... placing the burden
of loss on the party in possession will put pressure on him to protect
the property." 6
The importance attached to possession may be seen in this: Many
Courts which have spoken-often rather loosely-about the risk of
loss attaching to the purchaser upon the signing of the contract, have
41 Cal. App. 500, 183 Pac. 216 (1919). But see Kelly v. Smith, 218 Cal. 543, 551, 553,
24 P. 2d 471, 474, 476 (1933) (where the court refused to place the risk of loss on the
vendor where the purchaser was in possession under an installment contract, thus ap-
parently overruling Cooper v. Huntington, supra, and said: "Besides bearing in mind
the great development of trade through the medium of such contracts ... we ought
to consider upon whose shoulders devolves the responsibility of so caring for the
property that fire will not occur, and how improper care will contribute to the hazard
thereof .... [W]here the vendee is in possession, enjoying the entire beneficial use of
the property, having acquired an estate which he may convey or encumber, and which
to all intents and purposes is his, the great majority of opinion holds that the loss
should fall upon him, such being the manifest intent of the parties where title is retained
solely as security. ... And this result is arrived at not by the legerdemain involved in
the doctrine of equitable conversion so much as it is by the contract and the manifest
purpose of the parties.") And see Ware v. Security-First Nat. Bank, 7 Cal. 2d 604, 61 P.
2d 936 (1936) (holding that the loss should fall on the purchaser in possession under
an installment contract because the contract of sale provided that the purchaser keep
all buildings insured against fire, thereby evidencing an intention that the vendor should
retain title only as security for the price). The vacillation in the California decisions
should now be resolved by the courts in view of the adoption by that state of the
Uniform Vendors and Purchasers Risk Act, discussed infra. See also Wilson v. Clark, 60
N.H. 352 (1880).
8 4 LANGDELL, A BRIEF SURVEY OF EQUITY JURIsDIcTION 58 (2d. 1908).
85 Williston, The Risk of Loss After an Executory Contract of Sale in the Common
Law, 9 HAzv. L. REv. 106, 111, et seq. (1895). See also Notes, 6 MINN. L. REV. 513 (1922)
and 2 Wis. L. REv. 174 (1923).
86 Simpson, Legislative Changes in the Law of Equitable Conversion by Contract: I1,
44 YALE L. J. 756, 757 (1935).
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referred significantly to the fact that at the time of the loss the pur-
chaser was in possession of the property.37
The view that possession should be the criterion of risk culminated
in the Uniform Vendors and Purchasers Risk Act,88 which has been
adopted in eight states.39 This statute provides:
Any contract hereafter made in this State for the purchase and sale of realty
shall be interpreted as including an agreement that the parties shall have the fol-
lowing rights and duties, unless the contract expressly provides otherwise: (a)
If, when neither the legal title nor the possession of the subject matter of the
contract has been transferred, all or a material part thereof is destroyed without
fault of the purchaser or is taken by eminent domain, the vendor cannot en-
force the contract, and the purchaser is entitled to recover any portion of the
price that he has paid; (b) If, when either the legal title or the possession of
the subject matter of the contract has been transferred, all or any part thereof
is destroyed without fault of the vendor or is taken by eminent domain, the
purchaser is not thereby relieved from a duty to pay the price, nor is he en-
titled to recover any portion thereof that he has paid.
(5) The fifth view, advanced by some authors, 40 is "that the burden
of loss should be placed on the vendor unless there is something in
the contract or in the relation of the parties from which the Court
can infer a different intention." On this theory, possession "may or
may not be a sufficient controlling element. ' 4' This test would seem
to be rather vague, and it has not received any avowed judicial accept-
ance; but it is not inconsistent with the decisions in those states which
take the view that the burden of loss is on the vendor until he con-
veys, or with the decisions in those states which adopt possession as
the test.
INSURANCE
No consideration of the problem of risk of loss would be adequate
or realistic if it failed to take into account the matter of insurance.
Most cases of damage during the interval between contract and con-
veyance involve fire losses which are covered by insurance. Whether
87 See, e.g., Anderson v. Yaworski, 120 Conn. 390, 181 A 205, 101 A.L.R. A.1232 (1935)
and Smith v. Phoenix Insurance Co., 91 Cal. 323, 27 Pac. 738 (1891).
889c U.L.A. 313, 314 (S 1).
89 Not in Illinois. The statute has been adopted in California, Hawaii, Michigan,
New York, North Carolina, Oregon, South Dakota and Wisconsin.
40 Vanneman, Risk of Loss, in Equity, Between the Date of Contract to Sell Real
Estate and Transfer of Title, 8 MINN. L. REV. 127 (1924); 6 CORN. L. Q. 111 (1920);
79 U. of PA. L. Rlv. 239 (1930).
41 Vanneman, supra, footnote 40, at 143.
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the vendor or purchaser is to bear the burden of the loss should deter-
mine how and by whom insurance against fire is to be effected. It may
also determine how the insurance proceeds received by a party to
the contract are to be distributed. 2 We turn now to the Illinois cases
to determine how the courts of this state have dealt both with the
problem of risk of loss and the matter of insurance.
Few cases in this area of the law have had facts as unusual or prob-
lems as intriguing as the recent case of First National Bank of High-
land Park, as Trustee, v. Boston Insurance Co.4 There V, holding
title as trustee under a land trust, insured a residence with four com-
panies, in the aggregate amount of $46,750. Each policy indemnified
the insured "to the extent of the actual cash value of the property at
the time of loss but not exceeding the amount which it would cost
to repair or replace the property with material of a like kind and
quality within a reasonable time after such loss ... nor in any event
for more than the interest of the insured, against all direct loss by
fire."
V then entered into a contract to sell the property to P for $19,000.
P paid $1,000 as earnest money and $2,000 shortly thereafter. The
balance of $16,000 was due six months after the date of the contract.
The contract provided that premiums on the policies were to be pro-
rated as of the date of the delivery of the deed and that the policies
would then be assigned to P. It also provided, "If, prior to delivery
of deed hereunder, the improvements on said premises shall be de-
stroyed or materially damaged by fire or other casualty, this contract
shall, at the option of buyer, become null and void."
P did not take possession of the property. The parties had agreed,
however, that he could decorate the premises with a view to occu-
pancy upon consummation of the sale.
Before the balance of $16,000 was due or had been paid the build-
ing was totally destroyed by fire. Appraisals secured by the insurance
adjusters showed that reproduction costs would total $238,157.11
42 The same principles, of course, would be applicable to other insured losses; and
cases involving, e.g., tornado insurance and flood insurance, may well arise.
43 17 II. App. 2d 159, 149 N.E. 2d 420 (1958), aff'd, 17 III. 2d 147, 160 N.E. 2d 802
(1959).
44 This is not a typographical error. The opinion gives no hint as to why V con-
tracted to sell property having a replacement cost of $238,157, and covered by fire
insurance amounting to $46,750, for the sum of $19,000. Inquiry of counsel in this case
discloses, however, that V had a good business reason for making this sale.
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The companies conceded that the value of the property at the time
of the fire was substantially in excess of the insurance coverage. How-
ever, they "took the position that ... plaintiff's insurable interest did
not exceed $16,000, the unpaid balance due under the contract; '45
and they tendered this amount to V. Their theory, of course, was that
prior to the fire V's interest had been converted into personalty, and
that the measure of that interest (and therefore the measure of the
loss for which it could be indemnified) was the unpaid balance of the
purchase price.
V, of course, refused the tender and brought suit. It contended that
the measure of its loss was the value of the building, not exceeding,
of course, the amount of the coverage; and it argued that the com-
panies had no right to profit from the fact that V, for reasons of its
own, had elected to sell the premises for an amount grossly under
their true value. The companies, V urged, were not entitled to such
a windfall.
From a judgment in V's favor for $46,750, the full amount of the
policies, the companies appealed.
The Appellate Court was confronted with two questions: (1)
What was the nature of V's interest at the time of the fire? (2) What
was the measure of that interest and of V's loss?
The answer to the first of these questions depended, of course, on
whether an equitable conversion had occurred. On this point, the
Court said: 46
... It should be noted at the outset that we are not here concerned with any
change of interest or title effected by the . . . contract ... Illinois followed the
legal title theory and rejected the equitable conversion theory in Budelman v.
American Insurance Co., 297 Ill. 222 . . .holding the law to be well settled in
this State that an executory contract for the conveyance of real property does
not convey either the legal or equitable title to the vendee, and it is only when
the vendee performs all acts necessary to entitle him to a deed that he acquires
an equitable title and may compel a conveyance.
On the second question, the Court, having stated the defendants'
contention succinctly:47
The paramount question ... is the measure of plaintiff's loss. Defendants take
the position that fire insurance policies are contracts for indemnification; that
plaintiff's interest in the property at the time of loss, and hence the limit of its
45 17 111. App. 2d 159, 163, 149 N.E. 2d 420, 422 (1958).
46Id. at 165, 149 N.E. 2d at 422, 423 (Emphasis added). This statement is discussed
at length at p. 20, et seq. infra.
471d. at 164, 149 N.E. 2d at 422.
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right of indemnification, is represented by the amount of the balance then due
under the outstanding partially executed sales contract-$16,000; that upon
receipt of this payment,.., plaintiff will have recovered its loss and been fully
indemnified; and that the principle and purpose of insurance was thereby fully
satisfied.
rejected the contention in forthright fashion: 48
S.. The principle to be adduced [from the texts and decisions] is that such
policies are not contracts to insure property against fire, but to insure the
owner of the property against loss by fire; that destruction by fire . . .is not
the contingency upon which the insurer promises to indemnify the insured-
it is only when by fire the insured has sustained a loss that the insurer may be
called upon to perform its contract of indemnity. The policies ...limit the
insured's recovery . . .to its interest in the premises. The pertinent inquiry is
to determine the extent of the interest ...which is the object of indemnifi-
cation....
Under the policies ... defendants insured plaintiff 'to the extent of the actual
cash value of the property.., but not exceeding the amount which it would
cost to repair or replace the property . . .' It is admitted that the loss to the
... premises exceeded the insurance in force. How then is the interest of the
insured and the actual cash value to be determined? Certainly not by the sales
value, which is a different thing, or by what one is willing to accept for the
sale of the property immediately preceding the destruction thereof by fire.
The Court concluded that the defendants were liable in the full
amount of the policies, and affirmed the judgment of the trial court,
saying: 4 9
... Conceivably, there may be many situations in which an owner of property
may be willing to sell for less than the cash value; his need for ready cash; his
disinclination to wait for an advantageous offer because of the attendant incon-
veniences during the waiting period; his wish to benefit an individual or an
institution by donating the property to the beneficiary, or selling it under the
market value. We feel that in any of these, or similar circumstances, the insur-
ance company would have no right to appropriate to itself the difference be-
tween the actual cash value, which represents the loss for which the insured
paid premiums, and the lesser amount, for which the sale was made.50
48 1d. at 166, 149 N.E. 2d at 423. 49 id. at 170, 149 N.E. 2d at 425.
50 Cf. Dubin Paper Co. v. Insurance Co. of North America, 361 Pa. 68, 63 Ad. 2d 85
(1949) and Milwaukee Mechanics Insurance Co. v. Maples, 37 Ala. App. 74, 66 So. 2d 159
(1953), both of which were relied upon by the Appellate Court. Dubin is especially
interesting on its facts. There, V contracted to sell improved real estate to P for $25,000.
Thereafter, before the sale was consummated, P obtained fire insurance policies total-
ling $25,000 in his own name. At the time the contract was signed, V had fire insurance
coverage, in his own name, with one company, for $23,500. He increased this policy
to $33,500 after the contract was signed. He also had fire insurance coverage for $3,000
with another company. Thus, before the fire, the aggregate coverage carried by V
and P was in the amount of $61,500. The property was damaged by fire to the extent
of $49,353. Thereafter the sale was consummated. P collected $25,000 on his own policy,
and then brought suit to compel the insurance companies to pay the coverage under the
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The opinion of the Appellate Court was bottomed on a premise
which it stated unequivocally-that "Illinois followed the legal title
theory and rejected the equitable conversion theory in Budelman v.
American Insurance Co., 297 Ill. 222 ... holding the law to be well
settled in this state that an executory contract for the conveyance of
real property does not convey either the legal or equitable title to
the vendee, and it is only when the vendee performs all acts necessary
to entitle him to a deed that he acquires an equitable title and may
compel a conveyance."'1
Whether this premise was sound we shall consider presently. The
Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Appellate Court; but it
did not deem it necessary to pass on the validity of the premise. It
reached the same conclusion by a different route: It held that what-
ever effect the doctrine of equitable conversion might have had on
the rights and obligations of the parties to the contract, it could not
affect the rights and obligations of others. The Court said: 52
The problem that the case presents is not an easy one. When insured property
is in a single ownership, it is not hard to hold to the orthodox concept of an
insurance contract as a personal contract of indemnity. But there are inherent
difficulties when there are multiple interests in the property. Those inherent
difficulties are augmented because the effect given to an executory contract
to sell realty, and to the doctrine of equitable conversion, differs significantly
from one jurisdiction to another. The result is that neither courts nor com-
mentators are agreed upon proper solutions for the many variations on the
vendor-vendee-insurer theme...
As we see it there are several difficulties with the position of the insurers. In
the first place, it transplants the doctrine of equitable conversion into an area
where it does not belong. That doctrine was evolved in order to carry out the
intention of the parties to the contract. To that end it acts upon the rights of
the parties to the contract and those who claim under them. But it has fre-
quently been held and stated that it should have no effect upon the rights of
others. Pomeroy states the limitation in these terms: 'The doctrine seems to be
correctly formulated by saying that the effects extend only to those persons
who claim or are entitled to the property under or through the instrument
or directly from or under the author of the instrument. Some of the cases
definitely hold that a conversion takes place no further than is necessary for
policies issued to V. The companies contended that after the contract of sale was signed
V's coverage was limited to the balance of the purchase price and that inasmuch as this
balance had been paid, V had suffered no loss. The Court held otherwise, expressing
the opinion that the companies erred in their interpretation of the word "loss"-that
the loss "which [they] contracted to pay to the owner .. is the actual worth in money
of that building before it was destroyed."
51 17 Ill. App. 2d at 165, 149 N.E. 2d at 422, 423 (1958) (Emphasis added).
52 17 Ill. 2d 147, 150, 160 N.E. 2d 802, at 804 (Emphasis added).
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the purposes of the will or other instrument.' Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence,
5th ed. sec. 1166; cf. Smith v Smith, 174 Ill. 52, 59, 50 NE 1083.
The Court concluded with this interesting observation: 53
One other point should be mentioned. In response to questions from the bench
during the oral argument in this court, counsel for the insured stated that the
insured was obligated to account to the purchasers with respect to the insur-
ance proceeds.5 4 Counsel for the insurers complained that this had not been
previously revealed, and both parties were allowed to submit supplemental
briefs on the effect of this statement.
... The contract of sale gave the buyers the option to cancel the contract if
the building was destroyed or materially damaged by fire. That contingency
occurred, and we do not see how the way in which the contracting parties have
dealt with the resulting situation can be a matter of concern to the insurers.
The respective positions, then, of the two courts of review may be
thus summarized: The Appellate Court held that an equitable conver-
sion had not occurred because the vendee had not performed "all acts
necessary to entitle him to a deed"-the payment of the balance of the
purchase price. The Supreme Court thought it unnecessary to pass on
this question: It held simply that, irrespective of how or whether the
doctrine might apply as between vendor and purchaser, "it should
have no effect upon the rights of others" and therefore the insurance
companies could not rely upon it.
53 Id. at 154, 160 N.E. 2d at 806.
54 How this obligation arose does not appear from the opinion. Suppose V recognizes
no such obligation to P, that the contract is silent on the matter of insurance and risk
of loss, that the policies have not been assigned to P, and that the jurisdiction holds
that the burden of the loss is on P. Can V collect and keep the insurance proceeds and
still hold P for the full balance of the purchase price? Or is P entitled to have the
insurance proceeds credited against the unpaid balance? And if P has already paid the
unpaid balance, can he charge V as constructive trustee with respect to the insurance
proceeds in V's hands? The traditional English view was that insurance was personal
to the vendor and that the purchaser had no claim to the proceeds even though he bore
the risk of loss. See Rayner v. Preston (1881, Eng.) 18 Ch. Div. 1. Accord: Brownell
v. Board of Education, 239 N.Y. 369, 146 N.E. 630 (1925). This rule was changed in
England by an Act of Parliament (15 Geo. V, c. 20, s. 47 (1925)). A minority of Ameri-
can jurisdictions still follow the old English view which denies any part of the in-
surance proceeds to the purchaser. The cases are collected in Annot., 64 A.L.R. 2d 1402(1959). The courts of this state have not dealt with the problem definitively. See dictum
in Budelman v. American Insurance Co., 297 I11. 222, 225, 130 N.E. 513, 514 (1921):
"... . the proceeds of the insurance are impressed with a trust which a court of equity
will compel him [the vendor] to execute." For an excellent discussion of the rights of
vendor and purchaser in insurance proceeds, see Cribber, Insurance and the Executory
Contract for the Sale of Real Estate, PROCEEDINGS OF SECTION OF REAL PROPERTY, PROBATE
AND TRUST LAW, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, PART II, REAL PROPERTY LAW DIVISION,
p. 3, et seq. (1961). Cf. Zenor v. Hayes, 228 Ill. 626, 81 N.E. 1144 (1907) (holding that
the vendee had an insurable interest in the property, that such interest was protected
after assignment of the policy to the vendee, and that he was entitled to the insurance
proceeds).
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The Appellate Court's unequivocal statement as to the Illinois law55
would seem, on close scrutiny, to be self-contradictory. The legal
title theory (followed in some states) 56 is that, for purposes of risk of
loss, no title, legal or equitable, passes to the purchaser until execution
and delivery of a deed. Illinois could hardly follow this theory and
still hold that equitable title vests in the purchaser when he "performs
all acts necessary to entitle him to a deed." What the Court obviously
meant to say is that equitable conversion does occur but only when
the vendee has fully performed.
A more troublesome problem, however, is presented by the Court's
assertion that it is "well settled in this State" that equitable title does
not vest in the purchaser until he "performs all acts necessary to
entitle him to a deed." True, Budelman v. American Insurance Co.,57
upon which the Court relies for this assumption, states this to be the
law; but it is believed that this has never been the law of this state,
and as we shall presently see, the matter has been laid to rest by a
decision rendered by the Supreme Court as this article is about to go
to press.5
In Budelman the facts were these: V insured his dwelling against
fire in the amount of $1,700. The policy provided:
This entire policy . . . shall be void if any change other than by the death of
an insured takes place in the interest, title or possession of the subject of insur-
ance (except change of occupants without increase of hazard) ... by voluntary
act of the insured or otherwise.
Thereafter V contracted to sell the property to P on an installment
basis (the familiar Articles of Agreement for Warranty Deed). The
contract "contained the usual provisions . . . that the vendor would
convey the property by warranty deed after the vendee had made
the payments in accordance with the contract, and ... that a failure
55 17 Ill. App. 2d 159, 165, 149 N.E. 2d 420, 423 (1958): "Illinois followed the legal title
theory and rejected the equitable conversion theory in Budelman v. American Insurance
Co., 297 Ill. 222, 130 N.E. 513 (1921) (cited and discussed by both counsel), holding the
law to be well settled in this state that an executory contract for the conveyance of real
property does not convey either the legal or equitable title to the vendee, and it is only
when the vendee performs all acts necessary to entitle him to a deed that he acquires
an equitable title and may compel a conveyance."
50 See authorities cited in footnotes 29 and 30 supra.
57297 Ill. 222, 130 N.E. 513 (1921).
5s Shay v. Penrose, No. 37026, decided by the Supreme Court of Illinois on Septem-
ber 28, 1962. As of this writing, the case is not yet reported. The time for filing a
petition for rehearing, however, has expired, and inquiry of counsel discloses that no
such petition has been filed. See pp. 25, 30-31 infra.
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to make the payments would . . . forfeit all payments theretofore
made and all rights of the vendee in the property." 59 The contract
was silent on whether V or P was to have possession of the premises.
V did enter into possession, however, and continued to live on the
premises until they were damaged by fire.
V brought suit on the policy; and the insurer denied liability on
the ground, inter alia, that "there had been a change of interest ...
within the meaning of the policy." This contention, of course, was
based on the premise that the contract had caused an equitable con-
version, resulting in the vesting of the title, in equity, in P. On this
point, however, the Court said: 60
'Interest,' as used in the alienation clause of this policy, means legal interest,
and therefore is retained by the party holding the legal title.
The Court also made this assertion: 1
The law is well settled in this State that an executory contract of sale does
not convey title to the vendee. The vendor retains the legal title and the vendee
does not even take an equitable title. (Chappell v. McKnight, 108 Ill. 570; . . .)
When the vendee performs all acts necessary to entitle him to a deed, then,
and not until then, he has an equitable title and may compel a conveyance. So
it has been held in this State that, since a vendee has neither legal nor equitable
tide, the provisions of an insurance policy forbidding a change of title are not
violated by entering into the ordinary contract for a deed .... In an action at
law the vendor, being the holder of the legal title, is regarded as the sole and
unconditional owner of the property, although the property in his hands or
the proceeds of the insurance are impressed with a trust which a court of equity
will compel him to execute. (Security Ins. Co. v Kuhn, 207 Ill. 166). The risk
of the property remains with the title, and the contract is personal with the
vendor, the loss or destruction of the property falling upon him as the owner.
On analysis, the statement in Budelman that an equitable title vests
in the vendee when he "performs all acts necessary to entitle him to
a deed" is clearly obiter dictum; for the Court having concluded that
" 'interest,' as used in the alienation clause of this policy, means legal
interest," everything that it said about the point of time at which the
equitable title vests in the purchaser was unnecessary to the decision.
In discussing the problem of equitable conversion and risk of loss,
the Court said: 62
... The courts of some States ... have adopted the rule that the term 'tide'
in the alienation clause of insurance policies refers to either legal or equitable
title.
69 Budelman v. American Ins. Co., 297 Ill. 222, 224, 130 N.E. 513 (1921).
60 Id. at 224, 130 N.E. at 514. (Emphasis added.)
61 Id. at 225, 130 N.E. at 514. 62 Id. at 226-27, 130 N.E. at 514.
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•.. It will be seen that this line of decisions is in direct conflict with the settled
law of this State. In the states where this theory prevails it is held that the
loss in case of fire falls on the vendee, the holder of the equitable title, and
for that reason they hold that a policy similar to the one before us insuring
the vendor is forfeited where the vendee enters into possession of the property
under an executory contract of sale. . . .In this State the loss in case of fire
falls on the vendor, the holder of the legal title, who accordingly must apply
any insurance he receives to the re-building of the premises. Being responsible
for the delivery of the premises when the vendee complies with the terms of
the contract, his interest in the property is not lessened, and by permitting
the vendee to occupy the property he does not lose his legal title, interest or
possession....
A few months after the decision in Budelman, the Supreme Court
decided Knights v. Knights.63 There W, a widow, brought suit to
establish homestead, dower and other rights in certain land, charging
that her deceased husband, D, had attempted to deprive her of these
rights by fraud. D had caused the title in the land, when acquired, to
be conveyed to X. The Court held that an equitable title had vested
in D upon the making of the contract for the purchase of the land,
and that therefore W was entitled to assert homestead and dower
rights in the property. The Court said: 64
• ..The situation presented ...requires the application of the doctrine of
equitable conversion. When a valid, enforceable contract has been entered into
for the sale of real estate, as between the vendor and vendee equity regards
the vendee as the owner of the land and the vendor as the owner of the pur-
chase money. The vendor is regarded as the trustee of the naked legal title
for the benefit of the vendee, and the vendee is the trustee of the purchase
money for the benefit of the vendor. Therefore ... D was the equitable owner
of the real estate in question after the contract of sale was entered into....
This statement in Knights must also be regarded as obiter dicta.
Since the legal title was in fact conveyed to X on a secret trust for
D's benefit, the consideration for the transfer having been paid by D,
it is clear that D was the beneficiary of a resulting trust and therefore
the equitable owner of the property; " and inasmuch as W's home-
stead and dower rights attached, in any event, to the equitable title
of D as the beneficiary of a resulting trust, what the Court said about
the equitable title vesting in D immediately upon the making of the
contract was unnecessary to the decision.
63 300 M1 618, 133 N.E. 377 (1921).
64 Id. at 622, 133 N.E. at 378. (Emphasis added.)
65 "[lIt is well settled that a resulting trust arises where a transfer of property is made
to one person and the purchase price is paid by another." 4 Scow, TRusTs S 440 (2d ed.
1956).
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In any event the dicta in Knights-that the equitable title vested in
the purchaser immediately upon the making of the contract-was in
sharp contrast to the dicta in Budelman-that equitable title does not
vest in the purchaser until he performs all acts necessary to entitle him
to a deed. The contrast becomes even sharper when it is noted that:
(a) both cases were decided by the same Court; (b) they were de-
cided within a few months of each other; (c) both opinions were
written by the same Justice; (d) both were concurred in by all the
Justices; and (e) Budelman was not even mentioned in Knights.
Moreover, the Appellate Court in First National Bank of Highland
Park v. Boston Insurance Company66 did not mention Knights. It
rested its conclusion that the law is "well settled in this State that an
executory contract does not convey either the legal or equitable title
to the vendee, and it is only when the vendee performs all acts neces-
sary to entitle him to a deed that he acquires an equitable title" solely
on Budelman.
The fact is that the decisions of our Supreme Court prior to Shay
v. Penrose, just decided,67 were in sharp conflict on the question as
to when equitable conversion occurs. They seemed to agree that no
conversion will occur unless the contract is binding and capable of
forming the basis of a suit for specific performance." They parted
company on the issue whether the contract itself effects a conversion
or whether the conversion occurs when the purchaser has done all
acts necessary to entitle him to a deed.
Some early decisions in this state held that no equitable conversion
could occur unless the purchaser had performed all acts necessary to
entitle him to a deed. The leading case for this proposition is Chappell
v. McKnight.69 There the Court said: 70
66 17 I1. App. 2d 159, 149 N.E. 2d 420 (1958), aff'd, 17 11. 2d 147, 160 N.E. 2d 802
(1959).
67 No. 37026, Il. Sup. Ct., Sept. 28, 1962. See note 58 supra.
68 Masters v. Masters, 325 Ill. 429, 438, 156 N.E. 481, 484 (1927): "In order to work
a conversion the contract must be such that a court of equity can specifically enforce it
against an unwilling purchaser." First Nat'l Bank of Highland Park v. Boston Ins. Co.,
17 Ill. 2d 147, 151, 160 N.E. 2d 802, 805 (1959): "Equity regards as done that which
should be done, and so provides for the specific perfrmance of a land contract." See
also Rodisch v. Moore, 266 Ill. 106, 107 N.E. 108 (1914), and Sutherland v. Parkins,
75 Ill. 338 (1874). And see 4 POMEROy, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1161 (5th ed. 1941):
"In order to work a conversion, the contract must be valid and binding, free from in-
equitable imperfections, and such as a court of equity will specifically enforce against
an unwilling purchaser."
69 108 111. 570 (1884). 7Old. at 575.
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A mere contract or covenant to convey at a future time, on the purchaser
performing certain acts, does not create an equitable title. It is but an agree-
ment that may ripen into an equitable title. When the purchaser performs
all acts necessary to entitle him to a deed, then, and not till then, he has an
equitable title, and may compel a conveyance. . . .When the purchaser is in
a position to compel a conveyance by a bill in chancery, he then holds the
equitable title. Before that he only has a contract for a title when he performs
his part of the agreement.
The vitality of Chappell as an authority has been surprising. Al-
though the majority of cases in this state have held that a conversion
takes place the moment a valid and enforceable contract is entered
into 7 Chappell, like an unwelcome guest, has appeared on the scene
at most unexpected times. The result has been confusion and chaos
in the cases. Thus, Chappell was the basis for the decision of the
Supreme Court in Budelman v. American Insurance Co.,72 and Budel-
man, in turn, was the basis for the unequivocal statement of the
Appellate Court in First National Bank of Highland Park v. Boston
Insurance Co. 73 that it is "well settled in this State that it is only when
the vendee performs all acts necessary to entitle him to a deed that
he acquires an equitable title.' 74
The survival of Chappell in the face of numerous later decisions
taking a contrary view is all the more surprising when one considers
that the case is not a holding for the point for which it is cited. Chap-
pell involved an action in ejectment; and as we have seen,75 conversion
is an equitable doctrine and has no application at law. Moreover, the
issue was whether the purchaser had a right to possession prior to the
completion of the payments due under the contract, the contract
71 Smith v. Smith, 340 I1. 34, 172 N.E. 32 (1930); Knights v. Knights, 300 Ill. 618, 133
N.E. 377 (1921); Ward v. Villiams, 282 Ii. 632, 118 N.E. 1021 (1918); Rhodes v.
Meredith, 260 Il. 138, 102 N.E. 1063 (1913); Lewis v. Shearer, 189 111. 184, 59 N.E. 580
(1901); Fuller v. Bradley, 160 Ill. 51 (1895); Buck v. Eaman, 18 Ill. 529 (1857). Baldwin
v. Pool, 74 111. 97 (1874): "What were the rights of [the parties] after the sale and while
the purchaser was in possession under the contract? [The vendor] held the naked legal
title while the equity was in the purchaser. She was, in equity, the owner, subject to the
lien of [the vendor] for the balance of the unpaid purchase money."
72 297 I11. 222, 130 N.E. 513 (1921).
73 17 I. App. 2d 159, 149 N.E. 2d 420 (1958), discussed supra in text at note 43.
74 Id. at 165, 149 N.E. 2d at 423. Chappell is also relied upon in Gall v. Stoll, 259 Ill.
174, 180, 102 N.E. 225, 227 (1913): "[N]o title, legal or equitable, vested in [the pur-
chaser] by virtue of that agreement. It might have ripened into an equitable title upon
his making the payments necessary to entitle him to a deed ... and until that had been
done he had no title to or interest in the land."
75 See Connell v. Crosby, 210 II. 380, 71 N.E. 350 (1904), and the text accompanying
note 12 supra.
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being silent on that point. Even if the purchaser did have equitable
title, he would not necessarily be entitled to possession; and the state-
ment in Chappell was obiter dicta, not being necessary to the decision
of the case.
The conflict in the cases appears now to have been resolved by the
case of Shay v. Penrose.76 There the Court made this forthright state-
ment: 
71
We would be less than candid if we said that this court has been consistent
in applying the doctrine. Much of the confusion in this area arose from lan-
guage in the early case of Chappell v McKnight, 108 111. 570. It was there said
that the contract to convey at a future time did not create an equitable
title and that the buyer's estate would not ripen into an equitable title until
he had performed all acts necessary to entitle him to a deed. While the Chappell
case was one at law (ejectment) and therefore the equitable doctrine did not
apply, nevertheless, it was cited with approval in some subsequent equity cases.
(See, e.g., Walters v. Walters, 132 111. 467; Gall v. Stoll, 259 Ill. 174) We believe
the correct view to be that expressed in the majority of the cases which hold
equitable conversion takes place at the instant a valid and enforceable contract
is entered into and that the buyer at that time acquires an equitable title. To
the extent that the Chappell case and those following it are inconsistent with
this view they are hereby expressly overruled.78
RIGHTS OF CREDITORS
To what extent may the respective interests of the vendor and
purchaser be subjected to the claims of creditors? The problems here
are concerned primarily with the judgment lien.
At common law "the land of a judgment debtor could not be
reached by his creditors to satisfy their claims. '79 The noted English
legal historians, Pollock and Maitland, put it succinctly: 8 0
When judgment has been given for a debt, the sheriff will be directed to cause
the sum that is needful to be made ...out of the goods and chattels of the
defendant, or levied ...out of his goods and the fruits of his land. But our
common law will not seize his land and sell it or deliver it to the creditor;
seignorial claims and family claims have prevented men from treating land as
an available asset for the payment of debts.
76 No. 37026, Ill. Sup. Ct., Sept. 28, 1962. See note 58 supra.
77 Emphasis added.
78 The facts of this case are discussed, and an attempt made to appraise the impact of
the decision itself, infra, at pp. 30-3 1.
79 Kratovil & Harrison, Jr., Enforcement of judgments Against Real Property 1951
U. ILL. L. F. 1.
80 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 596 (Lawyers' Literary Club) (2d
ed. 1959).
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Acts of Parliament gradually changed the rule."' Today by statute,
both in England and in this country, judgment creditors may subject
the lands of their debtors, not exempt as a homestead, to sale for the
satisfaction of their judgments.
The statutory basis for the creditor's rights against his debtor's lands
has often been noted by our Supreme Court. In Smith v. Toman"2 the
Court said: 83
A judgment did not create a lien upon the real estate of the debtor at common
law.... A judgment lien is purely a creature of the statute. Sapp v Wightman,
103 Ill. 150; Noe v Moutray, 170 111. 169, 48 NE 709; Cooke v Avery, 147 U.S.
375.
Statutes creating such a lien have been in existence in this state since
1825.84
Section 1 of our present statute (the Act on "Judgments, Decrees
and Executions")8 5 provides that, except as to property registered
under the Torrens Act, "a judgment of a court of record shall be a
lien on the real estate of the person against whom it is obtained, situ-
ated within the county for which the court is held, from the time the
same is rendered or revived, for the period of seven years, and no
longer."
Section 3 of the Act defines real estate to include "... lands, tene-
ments, hereditaments, and all legal and equitable rights and interests
therein and thereto." If, therefore, the purchaser acquires an equitable
title to or "interest" in the land under the conversion doctrine, a
judgment against him should become a lien thereon, and such tide or
"interest" should be subject to sale. In Gorham v. Farson6 the Court
held that a judgment obtained against the purchaser before the con-
tract was made "attached the moment that [the purchaser] obtained
his interest, i.e. the moment that the agreement was made. ' 87
Clearly the judgment lien attaches only to the purchaser's interest;
and inasmuch as the creditor's rights can be no greater than those of
his debtor (a) the lien is extinguished when the vendor forfeits the
81 3 FREEMAN, EXECUTIONS § 371 (3d ed. 1900); Loyd, Executions at Common Law,
62 U. PA. L. REv. 354, 362 (1914).
82 368 Ill. 414, 14 N.E. 2d 478. 84 Illinois Laws 1825, at 151.
83 Id. at 417, 14 N.E. 2d at 480. 85 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 77 (1961).
86 119111.425,431, 10 N.E. 1, 5 (1887).
87 Contra, Carbine v. Morris, 92 111. 555 (1879); Hatch v. Wagner, 15 111. 127 (1853);
(both holding the purchaser's interest not subject to execution until the purchase price
was paid in full and the purchaser was entitled to specific performance).
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purchaser's rights or rescinds the contract because of the purchaser's
default88 and (b) the lien is inferior to the lien of the vendor as se-
curity for the balance of the purchase price. 9
A judgment entered against the vendor before the contract is made
will, of course, have priority over the purchaser's rights 0
A judgment entered against the vendor after the contract is made
will create a lien against his interest in the property. This "interest"
is the legal title which he holds in trust for the vendee under the
conversion doctrine; and the rights of such a creditor will necessarily
be subject to those of the purchaser, provided he had notice, actual
or constructive, of the purchaser's rights. To what extent, if at all,
the purchaser must take cognizance of the judgment, whether the
docketing of the judgment itself constitutes constructive notice to the
purchaser, and similar questions are beyond the purview of this ar-
ticle. They have been discussed in scholarly fashion elsewhere and
need no elaboration here.91
DEVOLUTION OF PROPERTY UPON DEATH OF VENDOR OR PURCHASER
Under the common law canons of descent,9 2 real property "de-
scended," upon the death of the ancestor, immediately to his heir.
Personal property, however, passed to the personal representative for
payment of debts and ultimately for "distribution" to the next of kin."
The course of descent of real property was determined not by legis-
lation but by judicial precedent; and under the feudal principle of
primogeniture, one was survived not by "heirs" but by a single "heir"
(the eldest son if the decedent was survived by children). No court,
however, "administered" the real estate; the title of the heir, if chal-
lenged, was established in an action of ejectment at law.
At an early date (perhaps by the time of Magna Carta, 1215) the
88 Hayes v. Carey, 287 Ill. 274, 122 N.E. 524 (1919); National Bank v. King, 110 Ill. 254
(1884); Alexander v. Tams, 13 111. 221 (1851).
89 McLaurie v. Barnes, 72 II1. 73 (1874).
90 In re Buchner, 205 Fed. 454 (7th Cir. 1913).
91 See Kratovil & Harrison, Jr., Enforcement of Judgments Against Real Property,
1951 U. ILL. L. F. 1, 22, 23; Legislative Changes in the Law of Equitable Conversion
by Contract: I, 44 YALE L. J. 559, 577 (1935); Colvin, A Reconciliation of Priorities
Under Executory Contracts for the Sale of Land, 20 WASH. L.R. 159, 161 (1945).
92 See 2 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, 208-234; ATKINsON, WILLS 38, 39 (2d ed. 1953);
ROLLiSoN, WILLS 17-28 (1939).
93 See ATKINSON, WILLS 37, 41 (2d ed. 1953); 1 PAGE, WILLS 5 1.4 (Bowe-Parker Rev.
1960).
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ecclesiastical courts undertook the task of distributing the personal
property of a decedent.9 4 It is not clear, especially in the early medi-
eval period, precisely who was entitled to the decedent's personal
property. The rules of distribution were finally fixed by the Statute of
Distribution of 1670." This Act became the foundation of the English
law of succession to personalty and formed the basis of most statutes
in this country, including that of Illinois.
Inasmuch as the "heir" under the canons of descent and the "next of
kin" under the Statute of Distribution were not the same persons, it is
obvious that the application of the doctrine of equitable conversion
affected substantially the devolution of the rights and liabilities of
intestate vendors and purchasers in most cases. Primogeniture, of
course, has long since passed from Anglo-American law; and under
modern statutes of descent and distribution, heirs and next of kin, for
the most part, are the same persons taking in the same shares. Where
this is so, the application of the doctrine of equitable conversion fre-
quently does not change devolution on the death of either the
vendor or purchaser intestate. Some statutes, however, do draw a dis-
tinction between realty and personalty in some instances. Thus, in
Illinois, if one dies intestate, survived by one's spouse and parents,
brothers or sisters, but no descendant, all of the personalty is distributed
to the surviving spouse; only one-half of the realty passes to her, while
the other one-half passes to the parents, brothers and sisters.96 Under
such circumstances, the doctrine of equitable conversion may have
great impact on the rights and liabilities of the surviving relatives of
the decedent.
The basic principles applicable in this area have been well sum-
marized by a noted authority: 7
The doctrine of equitable conversion by contract had its origin in cases in-
volving the devolution of rights and liabilities under land contracts upon the
death of one of the parties. Suppose that the vendor who has contracted to
sell Blackacre dies intestate before completion. Legal title descends to the heir;
but is the heir entitled to enforce the contract and receive the purchase money,
or is the vendor's administrator entitled to the purchase money as personal
estate and the heir liable to be deprived of legal title to the profit of the next-
of-kin? Or suppose that the purchaser dies: His estate is liable for the unpaid
94 1 HOLDSWORT, HISTORY oF ENCLISH LAW 626 (1922).
95 22 & 23 Car. II, c. 10.
9 6 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, S 11 (1961).
97 Simpson, Legislative Changes in the Law of Equitable Conversion: I, 44 YAE L.J.
559, 561-62 (1935).
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purchase price, but who is to pay it, as between heir and administrator, and
who is to get the land? The answer of classical equity to these questions was
a clear-cut and logical one. The vendor from the time of the contract had a
claim for money secured by a vendor's lien on the land. On his death, his
administrator succeeded to the money claim; and, in equity, the security fol-
lowed the debt and could be realized upon by the executor although legal title
had passed to the heir, a donee. The purchaser, on the other hand, from the
time of the contract was regarded in equity as owner of the land and as debtor
for the purchase money. On his death, his heir took this 'land' by descent and
his administrator became liable to pay the purchase money out of the personal
estate and thus exonerate the land from the vendor's lien thereon. Thus, in the
case of the vendor's death, legal title is taken from the heir to enable the ad-
ministrator to recover the purchase price for the benefit of the next-of-kin;
while, in the case of the purchaser's death, the heir receives the land gratis at
the expense of the next-of-kin.
We turn now to the Illinois cases, in which these principles have
been well exemplified.
Death of Vendor
In Rhodes v. Meredith,9" V contracted to sell farm land to P.
V died intestate, and his widow, W, as administratrix of his estate,
filed a bill in equity joining as defendants P and a minor child, X, and
alleging that (a) individually and as administratrix, she was ready to
comply with the terms of the contract by executing a deed to P upon
his compliance therewith and (b) X was V's legally adopted daughter
and as such was entitled to inherit from him as though she were a
natural child. A decree was entered directing W to execute the deed,
which she did. Subsequently, a brother of V brought the instant suit,
for partition, claiming an interest in the real estate as an heir of V and
contending that X was not a legally adopted child and had no interest
in the property. The Supreme Court held that it was unnecessary to
determine the adoption issue. Under the doctrine of equitable conver-
sion, the interest of V, after the making of the contract, was personal
property; and as such if X had not been legally adopted the entire
interest passed to W, but if legally adopted a one-third interest passed
to W and a two-thirds interest to X. In short, inasmuch as V's interest
was not realty his brother, in either event, took nothing upon V's
death intestate.99
The Court said:
Again, the situation presented by this record requires the application of the
doctrine of equitable conversion . . . When a valid, enforcible contract has
98 260 1. 138, 143, 102 N.E. 1063 (1913).
99 See Footnote 1, supra for the controlling statutory provision.
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
been entered into for the sale of real estate, as between the vendor and vendee
equity regards the vendee as the owner of the land and the vendor as the
owner of the purchase money, which is personalty . . . Where the owner of
real estate thus enters into a valid contract for its sale, the nature of his estate
under the doctrine of equitable conversion is changed and the real estate will
be regarded as converted into personal property, and, in case of the death of
the vendor before the contract is performed, it will be treated as assets in the
hands of his personal representative....
... [I]n the case at bar the vendor of the real estate died intestate. There is
nothing here to prevent the full operation of the doctrine of equitable conver-
sion. Applying that doctrine, [the vendor] owned none of the real estate at the
time of his death which in this proceeding is sought to be partitioned among
his collateral heirs. Instead of the real estate, at the time of his death he owned
the obligation of [the purchaser] to pay the consideration, and this was per-
sonalty, and as such belongs to the administratrix, to be by her disposed of
and distributed in due course of administration. . . .The contract was valid
and enforceable, and the doctrine of equitable conversion applies to and con-
verts whatever interests [the vendor] had in the land into personal property.
Under this view, the question whether [X] is the legally adopted daughter of
[the vendor] becomes unimportant. If she be the adopted daughter, then the
personal estate of her adoptive father would, under the statute of descent, pass
to her and the widow. If she was not legally adopted, then [the vendor] died
leaving no child or children or descendants of such child or children, and the
widow, in that contingency, would be entitled to all of the personal property.
The principles enunciated in Rhodes were reaffirmed in a definitive
way in Shay v. Penrose.00 In Rhodes, V left him surviving W, his
widow, X, a minor child, and a brother. If X had not been legally
adopted and if the principle of equitable conversion had not been
applicable, the brother would have been entitled to a half interest in
the property. In Shay, V left her surviving her husband, W, and a
sister. The Court stated the facts succinctly:
... Between 1955 and 1960 she executed contracts for deed to separate pur-
chasers of four of the properties ... they are the type of contract for deed in
common usage by the profession. Each provided for a down payment with
the balances payable in varying amounts per month together with interest on
the balances from time to time unpaid. Each buyer went into possession under
his contract. Provisions were made for delivery of abstracts of title showing
merchantable title in seller, title examination by the buyers, methods of per-
fecting any title defects, and delivery of warranty deeds upon receipt of final
payment. The seller retained an option of forfeiture in the event the buyer
failed to perform his covenants, including that of making the specified pay-
ments.
The sister's contention, as stated by the Court, was "that equitable
conversion does not apply to a long term contract for the sale of real
100 See footnote No. 58, supra,
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estate prior to the time that both parties have performed all acts
necessary to complete the contract except tender of final payment and
delivery of the deed;" and she sought partition of the four properties
on the theory that under Section 11 of the Probate Act she was seized
of an undivided one-half interest in each parcel. The Court refused to
draw any distinction between a "long term" or installment contract
and a contract which contemplates payment of the purchase price in
a lump sum, and said:
... Equitable conversion took place at the time of execution of the contracts,
so that upon the death of the seller the plaintiff became entitled to the entire
unpaid balance of the purchase price as personal representative of the decedent,
since it was personal property under the doctrine of equitable conversion. The
option to declare the contract in default and the right to consent to the assign-
ment were therefore vested in the plaintiff as administrator.
Whether one agrees with the result in Shay or not, the case has the
decided merit of settling a vexing issue; for the Court, at long last, has
laid Chappell to rest. It has done so in unmistakable terms:
...We believe the correct view to be that expressed in the majority of the
cases which hold equitable conversion takes place at the instant a valid and
enforceable contract is entered into and that the buyer at that time acquires
an equitable title. To the extent that the Chappell case and those following it
are inconsistent with this view they are hereby expressly overruled.
The Court refused, however, to speculate on the effect of the deci-
sion in other areas, saying:
The defendant seeks, in effect, a definitive rule of application of the doctrine
in the several fields where it may be invoked, such as dower, insurance, joint
tenancy and the like. The issue here presented is devolution of title at the
death of the seller and we concern ourselves in this opinion only with that issue.
If, after the making of a land contract, V dies intestate, it seems clear
that his "interest", being personalty, is not subject to partition, since
only "lands, tenements, or hereditaments" may be partitioned under
the statute.1°1 In Ward v. Williams,"°2 V died intestate, holding legal
title to farm land which he had contracted to sell to P. He was survived
by W, his widow, children and grandchildren as his only heirs. In
holding that a partition action would not lie, the Court said:
We think ... that the court erred in determining ... that the land descended
to his heirs and therefore was subject to partition among the heirs and their
grantees. The equitable title to those two tracts of land was not in [V] at the
time of his death, but was in [P]. [V] had a lien . . .to secure the payment
101 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 106, § 1 (1961).
102 282 Ill. 632,641, 118 N.E. 1021, 1025 (1918).
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of the purchase money. He held the naked legal title in trust for the benefit
of [P] . . . 'Where the owner of real estate thus enters into a valid contract
for its sale, the nature of his estate, under the doctrine of equitable conversion,
is changed and the real estate will be regarded as converted into personal prop-
erty, and, in case of the death of the vendor before the contract is performed,
it will be treated as assets in the hands of his personal representatives.' Rhodes
v Meredith, 260 111. 138, 102 N.E. 1063.
In Butman v. Butman,10 3 after V's death intestate, W, individually
and as administratrix, filed a bill for specific performance of the con-
tract, joining as defendants P and certain collateral heirs (presumably
brothers and sisters of V). She alleged that (a) P was willing to per-
form the contract, provided he obtained a deed from all the heirs, but
that the collateral heirs had refused to execute a deed unless the pro-
ceeds were treated as realty, and (b) the proceeds of the sale and the
right to enforce the contract were choses in action, to be collected by
the administratrix and accounted for in due course of administration.
The Circuit Court sustained a demurrer to the bill. One of the
grounds for demurrer was that W was "seeking to convert real estate
into personal property, so that she may, under the rule of descent,
derive a greater portion thereof than she would if it should remain
real estate; and that, as between the parties the equities require that the
property should remain and be treated as real estate." The Court, with-
out passing on the question of equitable conversion, held simply that
W, as administratrix, had properly brought the bill for specific per-
formance and that the demurrer should be overruled. The Court said:
Whether the property be regarded as real or personal, appellant was materially
and directly -interested therein in her individual capacity. If treated as real
estate, she is the owner of half of it in fee, and, if personal property the whole
of it, subject, of course, in both cases, to the payment of the debts of the
decedent. The owner of property may, by deed, will or other conveyance,
dispose of it as to him seems best, but if he dies without making any disposition
of it, it takes the course directed by the Statute of Descent. As to the policy of
the statute that gives to the widow of an intestate who leaves no child or
children, or descendants thereof, half of his real estate and all of his personal
property, that matter is referable to the legislative authority and not to the
courts.
If, prior to the making of the contract, V had executed a will by
which he devised the property to X, is the devise adeemed by the con-
tract? The devise would have been adeemed, of course, by a deed,
since a will can pass only such property as the testator has at his
10a 213 111 104, 113, 72 N.E. 821, 824 (1904).
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death. 11 4 Indeed, where realty was involved, the common law rule was
that "a devise of land is revoked by a conveyance of the land by a
testator during his lifetime."' 1 5 Under this doctrine, "even if the land
was later reacquired by the testator it would not pass under the
will."' 06 This "was a special application of the general principle that
after-acquired realty could not be devised.'
0 7
These principles would seem to lead irresistibly to these conclu-
sions: If V, by entering into the contract, transferred an equitable
title to P, the devise made in his previous will was adeemed. In that
event (a) if the sale is consummated after V's death, the proceeds
thereof should pass to the executor and then to the legatee or legatees
entitled to the moneys in his hands, and (b) if the sale is never con-
summated, the property nevertheless should be treated as personalty
and pass as such under the will. In either case the devisee is in the same
position as the heir at law where V dies intestate: Each holds the
naked legal title; in each case, the personal representative is entitled to
all of V's rights under the contract.
The Courts of this state, however, do not seem to have passed on
either of these questions. Chancellor Kent, in Walton v. Walton,08
said:
... a valid contract, for the sale of lands devised, is as much a revocation of
the will in equity as a legal conveyance of them would be at law.
Suppose the situation is reversed: V enters into the contract and
subsequently makes a will devising the land. Here no ademption will
104 57 AM. JUR., Wills, § 1582, p. 1082: "The rule is universal that in order to make
a specific legacy effective the property bequeathed must be in existence and owned by
the testator at the time of his death .. "
105 Meily v. Knox, 269 Ill. 463, 466, 110 N.E. 56, 58 (1915); Brady v. Paine, 391 Ill. 596,
601, 63 N.E. 2d 721, 724 (1945): "The rule is well settled that if the testator, in his
lifetime, disposes of property specifically devised by him, this will operate as a revo-
cation of the devise." But see Strang v. Day, 362 Il. 110, 199 N.E. 263, 264: "The rule
which is best supported by reason is that there is no implied revocation of a devise
of real property where the testator conveys the property, reacquires title thereto, and
dies without republishing his will." Strang involved a general devise of all the testator's
realty. After the will was executed, the testator conveyed the parcel in question to the
devisee. Thereafter he reacquired it and owned it at his death. The Court held that the
devise was effective to give the devisee the parcel.
1 0 6 ATxINSON, WIiLs, § 134, p. 743 (2d ed. 1953).
107 2 PAGE, WILLS, § 21.79, p. 485 (Bowe-Parker Rev. 1960). Today, in most jurisdic-
tions, "the alienation of property devised by a prior will does not prevent such property
from passing under the will if testator reacquires it thereafter." Id., p. 486. See obiter
in Oglesby v. Springfield Marine Bank, 395 11. 37, 69 N.E. 2d 269, 279 (1946). And -ee
Strang v. Day, footnote 105, supra.
108 7 Johns. Ch. 256, 267 (N.Y. 1823).
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take place. True, an equitable conversion will have occurred the mo-
ment the contract was signed, and the equitable title will have vested
in the purchaser. In this case, however, V, with knowledge that he has
contracted to sell the land, devises it. Our Supreme Court has held that,
in such case, he must be deemed to have intended that the devisee
receive whatever rights V himself might have had under the contract
at the time of his death. If, therefore, the sale is consummated after V's
death, the proceeds pass to the devisee; if it is not consummated, the
land passes to him.
In Heirs of Wright v. Minshall,109 V devised lands to his sister.
Thereafter he entered into contracts of sale which remained executory
at his death. P paid the purchase price in full to the administrator of
V's estate, and V's heirs applied to the Probate Court for a prorata
distribution of the proceeds. The Supreme Court held that the devisee
was entitled to the entire proceeds, and said:
At the time the will was made, the testator held the legal title to this land.
... Suppose the party who had agreed to purchase it, had failed to perform his
contract, or the contract had been rescinded, it will not be pretended the land
would have gone to the heirs-at-law. It would have been controlled by the
will. By that, the legal title was devised to appellee, and there can be no ques-
tion she is rightfully entitled to the proceeds of this legal title when sold and
conveyed, and this, manifestly, was the intention of the testator. His intention
was, to devise to appellee such interest as he had in or to arise from the land,
and that was the purchase money, and, though described in the will as land,
the devise passed the purchase money.
In Beemer v. Beemer,119 in a similar situation, the Court said:
• . . By the contract . . . IV] merely agreed to make a conveyance of this
land . . . at a future time upon the payment of the purchase price. He still
held the legal title. If the purchaser failed to comply with his part of the agree-
ment the land remained the property of [V] if he should live, and, if the
failure to perform should occur after his death the title then passed to his
devisee.
Nor would [the devisee] be a mere trustee for the conveyance of the legal
title and the devise to her be an empty one in case [P] should perform his part
of the contract after the death of the testator. In that event the proceeds of
the real estate devised ... subsequently to the contract of sale would belong
to [the devisee] under the will ... By this devise the testator made it certain
that in the event the purchaser failed to perform, the land would go to [the
devisee], and in the event the contract was fulfilled and the purchase price paid
she would then receive the proceeds. 1 '
109 72 Ill. 584, 585-86 (1874).
110 252 Ill. 452, 463-69, 96 N.E. 1058, 1062 (1911).
111 To the same effect see First Trust and Savings Bank v. Olson, 353 I11. 206, 187 N.E.
282 (1933), Covey v. Dinsmoor, 226 Ill. 438, 80 N.E. 998 (1907).
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In brief, the consequences flowing from the death of the vendor
prior to the consummation of the sale, may be thus summarized: His
rights under the contract vest in his personal representative, since he is
regarded, in equity, not as the owner of realty but of a chose in action
for the recovery of the purchase price. If he dies intestate, the naked
legal title to the land will descend to his heirs at law; if testate, it will
vest in the devisee under his will. In either case, the personal repre-
sentative may bring an action in equity for specific performance of
the contract, joining P and the heirs or devisee of V, as the case may
be, as defendants. The decree will require the heirs or devisee to con-
vey, but it will direct that the purchase price be paid to the personal
representative. Thus, no beneficial interest passes to the heirs or de-
visee; they hold title solely as security for the payment due to the
administrator or executor.
Death of Purchaser
If the purchaser dies intestate before the sale is consummated, his
equitable tide to the property will descend to his heirs at law; if he dies
testate, it will vest in the devisee under his will. In either case, the title
will be subject to the lien of the vendor for the payment of the balance
of the purchase price. But the heirs or devisee may compel the pur-
chaser's personal representative to pay this unpaid balance out of per-
sonalty in the purchaser's estate, and they twill then take the property
free and clear.
The reason for this rather startling result is that, under Illinois law,
the personal property in a decedent's estate must be used for the pay-
ment of his debts before any recourse is had to the real estate. Realty,
then, is a secondary fund; it may be sold, under order of the Probate
Court, only when the personalty is insufficient to pay claims. 112 This
rule is applicable to all debts of the decedent, secured and unsecured.
Hence, a debt secured by a mortgage on the decedent's real estate
must be paid by the personal representative out of the decedent's per-
112 The Probate Act (hL. REV. STAT., Ch. 3, S 225) (1961) provides: "When there is in-
sufficient personal estate to pay expenses of administration, claims against the estate, or
legacies expressly or impliedly charged by the decedent's will upon his real estate, the
executor or administrator by leave of the Probate Court ... may sell ... for those pur-
poses real estate or interest therein to which the decedent had claim or title .... See
People v. Beckers, 413 IlI. 102, 104, 108 N.E. 2d 5, 6 (1952): "[T]he general rule in the
administration of estates in Illinois [is] that personal property must be exhausted to pay
debts and expenses of administration before resort may be had to real estate, unless
a contrary intent is expressly indicated or may be clearly implied from the provisions
of decedent's will."
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sonal estate; the liability to "exonerate" the land from the encum-
brance falls upon the administrator or executor. 113 In like manner, the
heir or devisee of the purchaser is entitled to have the personal repre-
sentative "exonerate" the land from the vendor's lien by paying the
purchase price out of personalty in his hands.114 In either case, the heir
or devisee is enriched at the expense of those who are to receive the
decedent's personal proprty.
In Sutherland v. Harrison,"5 P died intestate, survived by his
widow, W, a brother, and nephews (children of two predeceased
brothers), as his only heirs at law. W was appointed administrator.
Shortly thereafter the other heirs filed a bill for partition. A decree
was entered finding that W was entitled to one-half of the realty, and
the other heirs the remaining one-half. Thereafter V's personal repre-
sentative filed a bill in equity against all the heirs, praying that they be
directed to pay the amount due V under the contract upon tender of
a deed, and in default thereof that the contract be annulled. The
brother and nephews of P filed a cross bill, praying that W be required
to pay the amount due under the contract out of the personal estate.
The Circuit Court found that W ought, in equity, to pay out of her
own funds, without contribution from the other heirs, the balance due
under the contract, and that upon such payment the personal repre-
sentative of V should convey the premises to the defendants in the
proportions of a one-half interest to W and a one-half interest to the
other heirs. After payment of expenses of administration, the widow's
award, and all claims allowed against the estate, the personal property
was sufficient to pay the unpaid balance of the purchase price. The
Court said: 16
There are no disputed facts here, the questions involved being those of law,
and mainly the one whether the widow should be held to pay the entire amount
of the unpaid purchase money for this acre of land, or only her proportional
part thereof, according to her interest in the land.
113 As to exoneration of mortgaged land, see 3 WOERNER, AMERICAN LAW OF AD-
MINISTRATION, § 494 (3d ed. 1923); 40 HARV. L. REV. 630 (1927). The cases are collected
in Annotations in 5 A.L.R. 488, 19 A.L.R. 1429, 29 A.L.R. 1246, 72 A.L.R. 709.
"4 Milner v. Mills, Mos. 123 (Ch. 1729); Young v. Young, 45 N.J. Eq. 27, 34, 16
Ad. 921, 925 (1889), 57 Am. JUR, WILLS, S 1474: "Applicability of the broad principle
that the personal estate of a testate decedent is the primary source for the payment of
his debts to the exoneration of real property devised by a will from payment of mort-
gage or other liens created thereupon by the testator during his lifetime is recognized
in many decisions, with the result that in the absence of controlling statutory pro-
visions or the expression of any contrary intention on the part of the testator, a devisee
is ... entitled to have such liens paid from the residuary estate in exoneration of the
land devised."
115 86 Ill. 363 (1877). 116 Id. at 365.
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Our statute . . . provides, that 'when there shall be a widow and no child or
children or descendants of a child or children of the intestate ... then the one-
half of the real estate, and the whole of the personal estate, shall go to such
widow as her exclusive estate forever.'
Under this provision, is the widow entitled to have and enjoy the personal
property which she has received as distributee, without the deduction of this
debt in question?
It is a well-settled principle, that in the administration of assets the personal
estate is the natural and primary fund for the payment of debts and legacies,
and, as a general rule, must first be exhausted before the real estate can be made
liable; and it will not be exonerated by a charge on the real estate, unless there
be express words, or a plain intent, in the will, to make such exoneration.
The Court said further: 117
[N]o dissent is found in the cases from the general doctrine that where one
gives a mortgage on land for a debt of his own contracting, his personal estate
is the primary, not the auxiliary, fund for the payment of the mortgage debt,
and the debt should be paid out of the personal property to the exoneration
of his real estate. . . . If a mortgage creditor proceeds against the land, the
heir or devisee is prima facie entitled to reimbursement out of the personal
estate.
As respects a contract for the sale of land, in the view of a court of equity
that which is effectually contracted to be done, is to be considered as done,
and it holds that such contracts are, for the most part, equivalent in equity to
actual conveyances in law. The vendor, as between him and the vendee, is
from the time of the contract regarded in equity as a trustee of the land for
the purchaser, and the latter a trustee of the purchase money for the former,
so that the purchaser is treated as the equitable owner of the land, and it is
devisable and descendable as is real estate; and the money is treated as the
personal estate of the vendor, and is subject to the like modes of disposition by
him as other personalty, and is distributable in like manner on his death ...
And . . . unless some circumstances affect the case, the heir of the purchaser
may require the purchase money to be paid out of the personal estate of the
purchaser in the hands of his personal representative. Indeed, so far from there
being any distinction in this respect . . . between the case of a mortgage debt
where there is a mortgage on land, and that of a debt for the unpaid purchase
money for land where there is a vendor's lien therefor, there are numerous
explicit decisions to the contrary, which directly hold that in case of such
unpaid purchase money the personal representative must pay the purchase
money out of the personal property for the benefit of the heir.
The Court concluded as follows: 118
We find no circumstance here to differ the debt in question from any ordinary
debt of the decedent in respect of payment of it by the administrators, and
are of opinion that it ought to be paid out of the personal estate and that the
heirs had the right to so require, and, as appellant as distributee had received
more than sufficient for the purpose, that the court below rightly decreed the
payment by her.
117 ld. at 367, 3 68 (Emphasis added), 118 Id. at 370,
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In Watts v. Killian,"' the Supreme Court, in citing Sutherland with
approval, said: 120
The law applicable where the question arises between a widow and heirs or
devisees was determined in Sutherland v Harrison.... The court said it was
well settled that the personal estate is the ... primary fund for the payment
of debts ... and that there was no distinction between the case 'where there is
a mortgage on land and that of a debt for unpaid purchase money for land
where there is a vendor's lien therefor .... A decree requiring the widow to
pay out of her own money without contribution from the heirs, the amount
of the vendor's lien, was affirmed.
The issue in Watts was whether the devisee was entitled to have the
personal representative exonerate the land from a mortgage by pay-
ment of the mortgage debt from the personalty in his hands. The
Court, in holding that she was, said 2' that there "is no distinction in
principle between that case [Sutherland] and this."
From a strictly logical point of view, the result reached in these
cases seems reasonable enough. If we take as our premises (a) that the
decedent himself, and not the land encumbered as security, was pri-
marily liable for the debt, (b) that the primary fund for the payment
of the decedent's debts (secured and unsecured) is the personalty in
his estate, and (c) that the equitable interest of the decedent devolved
as land, we are driven irresistibly to the conclusion, as a matter of
strict logic, that the land must be paid for by the personal representa-
tive out of the decedent's personal estate. But however logical, and
however well suited to a society of landed gentry desirous of keeping
their land holdings intact from generation to generation, and however
consistent with the spirit of the old English law which "favours the
heir," 122 the result reached, it is believed, would seldom be in accord
with the decedent's intent. Most testators, if their attention had been
directed to the point, probably would have provided expressly that
their interests under land contracts and their equities of redemption in
mortgaged properties should not be exonerated at the expense of their
personal estate; and most persons dying intestate probably would have
viewed such exoneration with similar disfavor.
Indeed, the rule caused such hardship and injustice that in England,
as early as 1854, Parliament passed an Act providing that there should
119 300111. 242, 133 N.E. 295 (1921).
120 300 Ii. at 247, 133 N.E. at 297 (Emphasis added.)
121 300 Ill. at 247, 133 N.E. at 297.
122 Shadwell, V.C. in Lumsden v. Fraser, 12 Sim. 263 (Ch. 1841).
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be no right of exoneration of mortgaged land upon intestacy, and
none where the mortgagor died testate unless expressly provided for
in his will. 123 In 1877 Parliament extended this rule to "any other
equitable charge, including any lien for unpaid purchase money. "124
The effect of these statutes, commonly referred to as Locke King's
Acts, is to leave the personal representative liable for the purchase
money or mortgage debt, but to make such indebtedness ultimately
payable out of the purchased or mortgaged land, if sufficient for the
purpose, rather than out of the intestate or residuary personal estate.
The heir or devisee thus takes subject to the vendor's lien or the mort-
gage, and the personal estate going to the next of kin or residuary
legatees is unaffected unless (a) the land is insufficient to pay the in-
debtedness due to the vendor or mortgagee, or (b) in the case of death
testate, the testator expressly provides for exoneration.
There is very little legislation abrogating the right of exoneration in
this country; and where such legislation exists, it is much less broad
than in England.125 There is no statute in Illinois touching on this sub-
ject. An Act to relieve the personal estate of the burden of exonerating
mortgaged realty and realty contracted to be purchased by the de-
cedent (except where the burden of exoneration is expressly imposed
by will) would seem to be highly desirable.
OPTION CONTRACTS
Suppose V gives P an option to purchase Blackacre. V then makes
his will, devising all his real estate to X, and all his personal estate to Y.
After V's death, P exercises the option. Who is entitled to the pur-
chase money, X or Y? In Lawes v. Bennett,2 6 the English Court held
that Y was entitled to the purchase money. The Court reached this
conclusion by holding that when the option was exercised the con-
tract of sale, which then came into being,-related back to the date of
123 17 & 18 Vict. c. 113 (1854), amended by 30 & 31 Vict. c. 69 (1867).
124 40 & 41 Vict. c. 34 (1877).
125 See statutory provisions in Louisiana, Massachusetts, Missouri, New Jersey, New
York and Oregon. N.Y. Real Prop. Law, § 250 provides: "Where real property, subject
to a mortgage executed by any ancestor or testator, or subject to any other charge,
including a lien for unpaid purchase money, descends to a distributee or passes to
a devisee, such distributee or devisee must satisfy and discharge the mortgage or
other charge out of his own property, without resorting to the executor or adminis-
trator of his ancestor or testator, unless there be in the will of such testator a direction,
expressly or by necessary implication, that such mortgage or other charge be other-
wise paid."
126 1 Cox (1785), Ch. Cas. 167, 29 Eng. Rep. 1111, 1113-14.
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the decedent's death; hence the property devolved in all respects as
though a binding contract in fact had been in effect when the de-
cedent died. The Court there said:
It is very clear that if a man seised of real estate contract to sell it, and die
before the contract is carried into execution, it is personal property of him.
Then the only possible difficulty in this case is that it is, left to the election
of [the optionee, P] whether it shall be real or personal. . . . [W]hen the
party who has the power of making the election has elected, the whole is to
e referred back to the original agreement, and the only difference is, that the
real estate is converted into personal at a future period.
- It will be observed that to reach this result Lawes applied two fic-
dons: (a) the fiction of relation back which created a contract as of a
time when it had not been made and (b) the fiction of equitable con-
version so as to transform realty into personalty. There are two ob-
vious difficulties with the decision:(1) It' enables P, a stranger, to determine the devolution of proper-
ty rights: the rights of devisee and legatee if V died testate, and the
rights of heirs and next of kin if he died intestate. If he exercises the
option, the legatee or next of kin of V receives the proceeds of the sale;
if he fails to exercise the option, title to the land, both legal and equita-
ble, vests in the devisee or heirs.
(2) As we have seen,127 there can be no equitable conversion, in
the absence of a binding contract, capable of being specifically en-
forced "against an unwilling purchaser." An option is not a contract
of sale, but an irrevocable offer to sell; it has been defined as "a con-
tract by which an owner of real property agrees with another person
that the latter shall have the privilege of buying the property at a
specified price within a specified time, .. . and which imposes no
obligation to purchase upon the person to whom it is given.""' During
V's lifetime, then, there is no binding, specifically enforceable con-
tract; and no conversion has occurred as of his death.
The majority view in this country"' is contra to the rule of Lawes
v. Bennett. Most of the American cases have held that conversion
occurs when the option is exercised, but that it does not relate back to
the date of the testator's death so as to divest the devisee or heirs of the
title which has passed to them under the will or the Statute of Descent,
as the case may be.
127 See p. 23 and cases cited in footnote 68, supra.
128 55 AM JUR., Vendor and Purchaser, S 27, pp. 492-493 (Emphasis added.)
129 4 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, Sec. 1163, p. 489 and the cases there cited.
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In Adams v. Peabody Coal Co.,1 0 V gave P an option, and there-
after executed a will devising the land to X. P exercised the option
after V's death. The Chancellor held that the purchase money should
be treated as personalty and pass to the legatee. The Supreme Court
reversed, holding that the devisee, X, was entitled to the proceeds of
the sale.
On a superficial analysis this case appears to be contra to Lawes v.
Bennett. This, however, is not necessarily so; for, as we have seen, even
if V had entered into a binding, enforceable contract to sell during his
lifetime, a subsequent will devising the land to X would pass the pro-
ceeds of the sale to him.' 3 ' This is on the theory that V, knowing that
he has entered into a contract to sell the land, intends, when he there-
after executes a will devising it, to pass to the devisee whatever rights
V himself would have had if he had survived; that is to say, if the con-
tract should not be performed by P, V intended X to have the land,
otherwise he intended X to have the money. If this is true where V
has entered into an enforceable contract of sale, a fortiori it is true
where V has given P only an option which is unexercised at V's death.
DOWER
At common law a wife had no dower, inchoate or consummate, in
her husband's equitable estates. 3 2 An essential element of dower was
that the husband have seisin during coverture, and he could be seised
only of a legal estate. 33
The legislature of this state has specifically provided for dower in
equitable estates. The pertinent portion of the statute provides: 18 4
Real estate contracted for by the deceased spouse in his lifetime, the title to
which may be completed after his death, and equitable estates are subject to
the right to elect to take dower.
It is difficult to understand how the courts can hold, in the face of
the clear wording of this Act, that P's widow133 is not entitled to
180 230 111. 469, 82 N.E. 645 (1907).
181 See pp. 3 3-34 supra and footnotes 109 and 110.
182 17 AM. JUR, DowER, S 59: "The necessity of legal seisin also made it impossible
at the early common law to base dower on the purely equitable interest of a cestui
que trust."
188 Bowen v. Collins, 15 Ga. 100 (1854); Beebe v. Lyle, 73 Mich. 114, 40 N.W. 944
(1888); Worsham v. Callison, 49 Mo. 206 (1872).
184 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 3, S 18 (1961).
185 Or widower, since all provisions of the statute relating to dower are applicable
to husbands and wives alike.
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dower upon P's death. Yet a number of cases in this state have so
held. 18 6 Most of these cases have quoted with approval this statement
in Walters v. Walters:13 7
Where there is a contract to purchase, and the purchaser has not paid the entire
purchase money in his lifetime, and, so has not become invested with an
equitable fee, no right to dower attaches at his death.
The value of Walters as an authority, however, was always extremely
doubtful; for the premise for the Court's conclusion that the widow
had no dower was this:
[W]hen [P] died he did not own the equitable title in the premises, because
his contract had not been performed. A mere contract to convey at a future
time upon the performance of certain acts by the purchaser, does not create
an equitable title.
For this proposition, the Court quoted from and relied upon Chap-
pell v. McKnight.'3s Inasmuch, however, as Chappell has now been
expressly overruled, 39 Walters should suffer the same fate. There
would seem to be no basis whatever for continued adherence to the
rule announced in Walters and other cases that P's surviving spouse is
not entitled to dower.
Moreover, even if the premise on which the Court relied in Walters
had been correct, the result reached, it is believed, in any event was
wrong. Whether or not P had an equitable estate from the moment
the contract was made was beside the point; for it will be noted that
under the statute above quoted W's right to dower is not dependent
upon an "equitable estate" in P. The statute specifically provides for
dower in any "real estate contracted for by the deceased spouse in his
lifetime, the title to which may be completed after his death." Since
this provision deals in specific terms with a specific subject matter it
should be controlling. The clause "and equitable estates are subject to
the right to elect to take dower" is certainly not a qualification of, or
limitation upon, the provision.
If it be urged, in support of the doctrine of Walters and similar
cases, that in order to permit dower to attach, some estate, either legal
or equitable, must have been vested in the deceased spouse during
186 Tink v. Walker, 148 II1. 234, 35 N.E. 765 (1893); Stow v. Steel, 45 1. 328 (1867);
Owen v. Robbins, 19 I1. 545 (1858).
137 132 M. 467,481, 23 N.E. 1120, 1121-22 (1890).
138 108 IU. 570.
139 See Shay v. Penrose, footnote 58, discussed supra at pp. 25, 30-31.
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coverture, a sufficient answer would seem to be that upon payment of
the purchase price by P's personal representative, P's title should be
deemed to relate back to the date of death to enable the surviving
spouse to claim dower.
This doubtless was the theory upon which the Court proceeded in
Greenbaum v Austrian,140 although it did not spell out the theory in
those terms. There it was held that if the administrator paid the pur-
chase money the widow's dower would attach. The Court also inti-
mated that if the personal estate was insufficient and P's heirs made
the payments from their own funds, W could perfect her dower
rights by contributing her prorata portion of the purchase money. If
this is true, then even though W were not normally entitled to dower,
she would be entitled thereto if the contract were performed by the
heirs and if she made her ratable contribution to the purchase price.
There remains to be considered this question: May the parties to a
contract for the sale of real estate provide, in the contract itself, that
the doctrine of equitable conversion should not apply? If such a pro-
vision is effective, it will of course avoid the problems presented by
the doctrine. In at least one case, Mackey v Sherman,' it has been
held that such a provision should be given effect. It would seem that,
in some situations at least, this provision would be highly desirable-
as, for example, if it appears probable that one of the contracting par-
ties may not survive to consummate the sale.
140 70 111. 591 (1873).
141 263 Ill. App. 109 (First Dist. 1931).
[TO BE CONCLUDED]
